The unsuccessful attempted coup launched on the night of September 30, 1965, set in motion a process which rapidly destroyed the regime of Guided Democracy and gave the Army hegemony over the succeeding political order. First, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was physically decimated and eliminated as a contender for power. Subsequently, President Sukarno, deprived of his most effective ally in limiting the Army's political strength, was gradually driven from the political arena:
The question of what attitude should be taken towards the politi cal parties was intimately related to the matter of elections. Should elections be held at all, and if they were, should the electoral system be regulated in such a way as to benefit the existing parties or to move towards restructuring the old political constellation? In the evolution of Army (and thus governmental) policy on the elections question one can see the pull-and-tug of the two perspectives out lined above.
The decision that elections would be held was formally taken by the MPRS (Provisional People's Consultative Assembly) at its first session after the coup, held in June and July 1966. The Army had initially been reluctant to promise elections.
In an interview shortly before the MPRS session, General Suharto expressed this reluctance clearly:
General elections can only be held if the requirements and conditions are ready. General elections are not important if they do not guarantee the democratic rights of the people free from fear and threats and free from direct and indirect compulsion. To guarantee healthy democratic rights, physical security and political security are needed.2
In the circumstances of 1966, the Army's caution was understandable. Throughout that year, political tension was extremely high--antiSukarno forces confronted the pro-Sukarnoists, and, in many areas, especially in Java, small-scale physical conflicts erupted between Muslim and nationalist youth organizations. The holding of elections in such circumstances could well have led to heightened physical conflict.
Second, from the Army's point of view, there was a real danger that supporters of Sukarno would do too well if elections were held too quickly. With these considerations in mind, the Home Minister, Major-General Basuki Rachmat told the MPRS session that the elected MPR3 should meet in about three years time, thereby implying a delay of nearly three years before the elections would be held. However, most civilian groups attending the MPRS session opposed delay. The Islamic parties in particular called for elections by the end of 1967 and they were supported by various cilivian action fronts which had sprung up after the coup attempt.4 Eventually, a compromise was reached, and the MPRS decided that elections would be held at the latest by July 1968. The government and the DPR-GR (Parliament)^were given the task of preparing the election laws.
With the acceptance of the principle that elections would be held, attention now turned to the elctoral system.
In August, shortly after the MPRS session, the Army held a seminar at Bandung. The purpose of the seminar was to enable the Army to work out its ideas on its role in^society; for though the Army had now become the dominant force in the government, it had yet to formulate a clear program of action. Among the questions for discussion were the coming elections and the party system.
In the published conclusions reached by the seminar,5 6 the views of the "New Order radicals" seem in the ascendant. The Army expressed something less than enthusiasm about the holding of the elections: "Endeavors to achieve political stabilization can be obstructed by activities before, at the time of, and after the elections. The elections and its results are not really major goals but just means for achieving greater stability in all fields."5 There was no point in holding elections if the New Order forces did not win: "It is very clear that the Pantja Sila forces must be victorious in the General Elections."7 To ensure victory for the New Order, the Army seminar proposed that in contrast with the proportional representa tion system that had operated in the 1955 elections, the elections now be held on the basis of single-member constituencies with the condition that every candidate would have to have lived for at least the previous year in the district he was contesting. Under this system it could be expected that locally-popular non-party candidates would have a better chance of success than under proportional representation, which would undoubtedly give the established parties an overwhelming majority of seats. The seminar also proposed a simplification of the party system with the formation of five groups--Islamic, Christian, Nationalist, Socialist Pantja Sila and Functional.8 3. The MPRS is appointed. After the elections the body will be known as the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly); the "S" stands for sementara (provisional). The conclusions of the Army seminar were not warmly received by the political parties. The Army proposals seemed aimed at breaking the hold of -the old parties by insisting on single-member constitu encies with a residency requirement, which would increase the chances of non-party candidates.
Information on the stands of the various factions in the MPRS
In addition, such an electoral system would be more amenable to local military pressure than would a sys tem based on proportional representation in province-wide constitu encies., The encouragement given to members of the previously banned parties to participate in the elections suggested backing for their strong anti-Old Order attitudes.
Three bills11 now sent to Parliament relating to the coming elections reflected in part the results of the Army seminar. The first was the Parties, Mass Organizations and Functional Groups Bill. Its essential purpose was to "simplify" the party system by estab lishing conditions for electoral recognition that might be hard to meet for the smaller parties or a grouping of parties unacceptable to the big parties. To be recognized, a party had to have at least 1.5 million members, as well as branches in at least half of the 25 provinces and in at least half of the more than 200 districts (kabupaten) . In addition, to remain in existence after the elections, a party would need to win at least two percent of the seats in the DPR (Parliament), a condition more easily met by smaller parties under proportional representation than under a single-member con stituency system. Apart from these provisions aimed at eliminating the smaller parties, the bill somewhat ambiguously declared that the parties were divided into three groups --nationalist, religious and "socialist Pantja Sila." In the statement accompanying the bill, it was explained that the purpose was to encourage parties with similar principles to join together, "whether the organization takes the form of a confederation, federation or fusion." As could be expected, this provision, which appeared to presage a forced unification of parties, met with the opposition of ali the political parties, both large and small. bill was thus regarded as too radical by the old political parties, while, at the same time, one of its provisions failed to satisfy the "New Order radicals" themselves. After a month of fruitless discus sion early in 1967 it was decided that it would be better to come back to this bill after the other two bills had been completed. In any case, it was felt, the elections could still be held even if this particular bill were never passed.
Discussion then moved to the General Elections Bill and the Structure and Position of the MPR, DPR and DPRD (regional DPR) Bill. The General Elections Bill was intended to regulate matters such as the electoral system and qualifications for candidates and voters. In accordance with the ideas expressed at the Army seminar, the national parliament was to be elected on the basis of single-member constituencies, each constituency covering one district (kabupaten or city). A simple majority system would be used. According to the statement accompanying the bill, this was suggested "bearing in mind the bitter experience of the period of general elections according to the proportional system." The principle of residency, as proposed by the Army seminar, was accepted in the bill, although the period eventually required was only six months, not a year as originally proposed. All candidates had to be nominated by a recognized party or functional group. Thus completely independent candidates could not stand,but candidates independent of the parties could.
In contrast with the earlier proposals of the Army seminar, members of the armed forces would not be permitted to take part in the elections (however, they would be amply compensated under the terms of the third bill) .
The Structure and Position of the MPR, DPR and DPRD Bill pro vided that half of the members of each body would represent the political parties and half functional groups. Of the functional groups, half would represent the armed forces (i.e., twenty-five percent of the total members of the body). The armed forces members would be appointed on the nomination of the commanders of the four forces. The bill was not altogether clear on how the balance between parties and functional groups was to be maintained among the civilian members, who, it appears, would all compete in the same constituencies during the elections. What would happen if the parties won more than half of the seats or less than half? Possibly the balance would be made up with further appointments, although this was not clear from the bill's wording.
Both of these bills met heavy opposition from the major political parties in parliament.
In particular, the parties strongly opposed the single-member constituency system. They demanded multi-member province-wide constituencies based on proportional representation without a residency qualification. Under this system, the contest would not be between individuals competing for local votes but between party lists; accordingly, the parties, with their province wide organizations, would do much better than locally-popular nonparty candidates. Apart from the question of the electoral system, the other major controversy was over the twenty-five percent quota for the military. The civilians as a whole were opposed to so many military appointees.
In responding to criticism by the political parties and other civilian groups, the government proved to be quite flexible. The principles announced at the Army seminar were quickly abandoned, al though the government's withdrawal was by no means a surrender, After discussions lasting a number of months, agreement on basic principles between the government and the parliament was reached in July 1967. The agreement consisted of twelve points known as a "package."13 On the government side, the parties' demands for proportional representa tion with multi-member province-wide constituencies and the abolition of the residency requirement were accepted. On the other hand, the parties made concessions on the question of appointment. The number of appointed members of the MPR would be raised to one-third, while 100 of the 460 members of the DPR (22 percent) were to be appointed. In addition, it was agreed that the government would have the right to appoint civilians who were not members of parties or organized functional groups.
Following this agreement, discussions continued on the General Elections Bill, which was completed and ready for passage in November 1967. Apart from the stipulation regarding the size of constituencies and proportional representation, this bill also contained a number of other provisions which were to some degree controversial. First, the bill declared that former members of the PKI or its mass organiza tions, as well as "other banned organizations" would not be permitted to participate as candidates or voters in the elections. This pro vision was important for those parties which had hoped to attract the votes of former supporters of the PKI. It also raised the issue of what was meant by "other banned organizations." Former members of Masjumi and PSI quickly pointed out that their parties had never been banned but had dissolved themselves (in the face of the threat of being banned, of course). This provision also seemed to be a step away from the conclusions of the Army seminar, which clearly supported the rights of former Masjumi and PSI members to participate in the elections. Another provision which was to some extent con troversial was added to the bill as a result of the failure to reach agreement on the bill regulating parties, mass organizations and functional groups. This provision (clause 34) declared that only recognized parties and functional groups that already had representa tives in the appointed parliament could contest the elections. This provision was opposed by the independents who had been appointed to parliament since the coup. However, they were forced to yield on this issue. Thus, by November 1967, the General Elections Bill had been dis cussed and agreement had been reached. The bill was very different to that which had been envisaged at the Army seminar and the sympathe tic attitude to the former members of Masjumi and PSI was no longer apparent. The decline of New Order radical influence was indicated by the government's clear inclination to see co-operation of the big political parties as more important than the aspirations of the small group of modernizing intellectuals.
It had been planned to pass the bill formally on November 27, 1967. However, it now met with an unexpectedly strong reaction from the New Order civilian forces outside parliament. The Bandung and Djakarta branches of the "scholars'" action front, KASI, declared jointly:
13. Nusantara, July 31, 1967. that the aspirations and struggle of the New Order requires an overhaul of the constella tion of political life in the homeland leading to renewal in all fields of national and social life.
In their estimate, the proposed bill did not lead to such a renewal. They condemned it as : the product of horse-trading between Old Order forces and forces which put more emphasis on sectional interests than on principles and ideals .1 * * At the same time students from Bandung demonstrated outside the parliament building.
In parliament, the independent intellectual group argued that the elections bill was part of a "package agreement" which also covered the structure bill.
In fact, the greatest con cessions had been given to the old parties in the elections bill, while the parties had given ground in the structure bill. Thus, the inde pendents argued, the passage of the elections bill should be postponed until the structure bill was also ready for passage. They did not want the elections bill to be passed and then find that the parties were not prepared to accept the structure bill. In this, the inde pendents managed to get the support of the military members as well as the Christian parties. Postponement was opposed by the PNI and NU. Eventually, it was decided to postpone passage of the bill, but, at the same time, it was agreed that the provisions of the bill would be considered as settled.
By about the middle of 1967, it had become clear that the laws necessary for holding the elections would not be completed in time to hold the elections by July 1968, as stipulated by the 1966 MPRS session. So, when another MPRS session was held in March 1968, to appoint General Suharto as full President, the opportunity was taken to formalize the postponement of the elections. At this session, the Islamic parties generally favored a short postponement.
In particular, the new Parmusi party wanted elections within 18 months. The nation alist group preferred a three year postponement, while the functional groups'representatives wanted one still longer. In particular, the independents were opposed to an early election.1 4 15 Eventually, a com promise favorable to the government was reached: it was decided to hold elections by July 1971, while, at the same time, President Suharto was appointed for a five year term, meaning that the elected MPR need not meet until 1973 to consider the question of extending Suharto's mandate or replacing him.
It was at about this time that the most prominent of the "radical New Order" generals, Major-General Dharsono, the commander of West Java's Siliwangi division, began to propagate his concept of a "two 14. Nusantara, November 27, 1967. It seemed that there was an inexhaustible reserve of ' 'crucial points" which could be brought out one by one as each pre vious crucial point was settled.
Indeed some observers felt that the government was deliberately bringing up these points in an attempt to have the elections postponed once again.
It was in this atmosphere that the President held separate talks with each of the political parties and the Sekber Golkar (Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups). The upshot was that, in November, parliament suddenly agreed, although somewhat reluctantly, to the government view that 20 percent of the members of the regional parliaments should be appointed. The two bills were then passed. The development of the government's position on the election laws between the period of the Army seminar and that of the package agreement reflects a slowly evolving decision against a thorough re-structuring of the political system and for a stabilization of the existing system. There are two basic reasons why the decision went the way it did. In the first place, the Army was not fully confident of its own cohesion and moreover, despite the Army seminar, still had little idea of what reforms it really might want to under take. Without a clear and cogent blue-print for the future, it could not expect that the armed forces would be united in implementing any drastic program. Rather than launch such a program which would certainly exacerbate existing tensions in society and might easily spread into the military itself, the Army leaders decided to play it safe. Second, the military leadership was anxious to maintain a reasonably wide base of civilian support.
If drastic action were taken to limit the role of the large parties, the government's civilian base would probably shrink to the more modern elements in the cities.
It was not that the Army leaders were afraid that the PNI and NU masses might force them out of power; rather, they believed that the process of running the government, especially in the regions, would be much easier with the cooperation of the large parties. Than without it. In addition, they came to the conclusion that stability in the legislative bodies about to be elected would best be assured by an alliance with the larger parties. There was thus every reason to be willing to make concessions on the electoral laws which favored these parties, provided that these parties' leadership remained as "manageable" as hitherto. To make sure that these expectations would bear fruit, the Army now turned to the task of extending its influence deep inside the larger parties and in the electoral system as a whole.
The PNI
The PNI had long been close to President Sukarno. Like Sukarno, it had cooperated with the PKI in the period before the coup. However, cooperation with the PKI was easier in Djakarta than in the regions where the PNI and the PKI competed for mass support. Both the PNI and PKI had their strongholds in Central and East Java. adjusting themselves to Sukarno's Guided Democracy, and many of them held high positions in successive cabinets. After the coup, it was members of the NU in East Java who were primarily responsible for the huge number of communists massacred in that area. However, they remained loyal to President Sukarno until the middle of 1966 when it appeared that the balance was tipping against the President. Later, in early 1967, it was the NU which took the lead in condemning the President and demanding that he be brought to trial.
(The NU thus demonstrated a well-developed capacity to adjust itself to changing times.) When the NU held its first post-coup congress in the middle of 1967, New Order militants outside the party hoped that the old leader ship would be replaced by younger elements with "clean" records, such as Subchan, the Deputy Chairman of the MPRS. However, the old leadership had no trouble defending its position.
Idham Chalid, who had been a minister through all the changes that had occurred since the 1950's, remained the leader of the party. By contrast with the case of the PNI, the authorities saw no reason to intervene in the affairs of the NU. They were sure that they would encounter no difficulties in dealing with Idham Chalid and his associates.
The Parmusi
Indonesian Islam has long been divided politically into two main streams--the traditional NU based on the rural areas of Java, and a more modern stream based on the towns and the areas outside Java. In the past, the more modern stream was represented by the Masjumi. After the banning of the Masjumi in 1960, the aspirations of this stream did not find adequate political expression. After the coup, former Masjumi leaders began to explore ways to bring the Masjumi back to life, since they believed that the former Masjumi masses had not switched their loyalties to the NU, and by 1967 it was clear that the government espoused the view that the political parties should continue to play a significant role in political life. The straightforward re-legalization of Masjumi was not acceptable to many generals who still remembered that Masjumi leaders had been associated with the PRRI-Permesta rebellion of 1958 that had led to the loss of many soldiers' lives.
However, the government did eventually agree to permit the forma tion of a new party that would base itself on the former Masjumi masses, provided it was not led by men who had held senior positions in Masjumi.
In late 1967, the prospective formers of the proposed party presented a series of lists of leaders, all of which were rejected by the government because they included people considered to have been high in Masjumi. Eventually, in February 1968, the proto-party backed down completely and submitted a list acceptable to the government.
In return, it obtained legal recognition.
The acceptable leadership,headed by Djarnawi Hadikusumo, had been put forward, with the understanding, at least on the side of the party, that it was a temporary leadership which could be re placed at the party's first congress to be held later in the year. In pursuing this task, the government-approved leaders of the party found themselves increasingly forced to rely on former Masjumi leaders, like Roem, who had far more influence over the potential supporters of the party than they. Government concern over this development was probably heightened by the fact that in the outer regions, sections of the party under strong influence of exMasjumi leaders were taking an increasingly critical stance towards the Army and the government.
Then in October 1970 one of the party's deputy chairmen, John Naro, announced that he had taken over the leadership of Parmusi. He claimed that the Djarnawi leadership had adopted a line that was bringing the party into conflict with the government. It is significant that in the preceding months Naro and his chief associ ate had been under criticism within Parmusi because of their close contacts with Opsus. Many observers believed Naro's "coup" to have been the work of Opsus.
In the weeks that followed, the Minister of the Interior and the Head of Bakin, the State Intelligence Co-ordinating Body (both generals),held discussions with the rival groups and extracted an agreement from both to leave the solution of the leadership problem to the President to solve. Eventually the President appointed one of his Ministers, Mintaredja, to head Parmusi and "heal the breach." (This appointment was welcomed by the Naro group but rejected by Djarnawi and his allies.) While the government had thus succeeded in installing its own man as chairman of Parmusi, the means by which this had been achieved were so transparent that many of the Djarnawi and Roem supporters will probably, out of disgust, no longer participate in the party's activities and thus weaken Parmusi very seriously.
Thus in the case of each of the three largest parties, the government has ensured that they will enter the election campaign with amenable leaders. The NU elected such a leadership voluntarily. The PNI did so as a result of heavy pressure.
In the case of Parmusi, the election of one unacceptable leader was ignored by the government and a substitute leader, who eventually became unaccept able, was pushed out after a government-provoked split in the party. Accordingly, not much serious opposition can be expected from the leadership of these parties.
If this is the case with the large parties, it is even more true of the smaller parties.
Sekber-Golkar
Aside from the great influence which it has established over the political parties, the government has sponsored what is in effect its own political party, the Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya (SekbarGolkar--Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups). The Sekber-Golkar is a federation of organizations, such as trade unions, students', women's and veterans' organizations not affiliated to political parties.
It was founded in 1964 as an alliance of functional groups under Army influence for the purpose of opposing the communists within the National Front. After the coup, it lost its raison d'etre; but with the decision to hold elections, it found a new one. Its main leaders today are army officers who, by the terms of the election laws, may not contest the elections or take part in the campaign. However, as leaders of Sekber-Golkar, they are able to influence the selection of the candidates.
In many areas, it can be expected that the Sekber-Golkar candidates will obtain the "backing" of local military commanders.
It is generally believed therefore that the Sekber-Golkar will be among the "big four" when the election results are announced. Accordingly, the fact that only a minority (although a sizeable minority) of the MPR and DPR will be appointed should not be too great an obstacle for the government after the elections. With the Sekber-Golkar as the government party and the other major parties under amenable leadership, the government should have little dif ficulty in having its legislation approved by parliament. Similarly, when the MPR elects the President in 1973, there can be no doubt that the Army's candidate will win. *********** Two basic elements can be seen in the government's attitude towards the political parties since 1967. First, it sees a need to permit the civilian parties to function as natural means of political expression and as links between the government and the people.
It has been concerned to ensure that the major socio cultural communities feel that they are represented in national politics, since it fears that if some major community feels un represented it will eventually become alienated from the government and will become a fertile bas« for political disturbances and worse. In the past, as shown in the 1955 elections, the main communities gave their support to the four main parties. The problem today, in the government's view, is to make sure that each major community feels that there is still some vehicle through which its aspirations can be articulated. Secondly, the government is determined to prevent such vehicles from posing any real threat to its own authority.
What has the government done to achieve these twin objectives? In the case of the NU, with its base among the traditionalist Muslims of Java, there was no need to do anything, as the party's leaders willingly transferred their support from the old to the new government and carried their followings with them. The problem of the supporters of the Masjumi, which had in effect been banned by Sukarno in 1960, was more complex. The former Masjumi leaders were still regarded with much suspicion by the Army leaders.
At the same time, it was felt essential that former Masjumi supporters, who had long been the dominant political group in the Outer Islands, should not remain unrepresented. Thus Parmusi was born, a body with out a head, so to speak, as former Masjumi leaders were not permitted to lead the new party.
In the case of the PNI, even more drastic action was taken. The old head had to be chopped off at the party's congress at Bandung in 1966. Then,in 1970, further intervention took place to ensure the election of an acceptable leader. These heavy-handed interventions have been required precisely because of the central roles the party is to play in the government's stabiliza tion. First, it must maintain its old role of representing its tradi tional clientele. Second, as the only large non-Muslim party, it is needed to balance the power of Islam. Thirdly, with the elimination of the PKI as an active party, a channel is required for the aspira tions of its erstwhile supporters. Since former PKI supporters are generally hostile to the Islamic groups, and since they tend to come from the abangan milieu from which the PNI also draws its strength, it is hoped that many of them will transfer their allegiance to the PNI, rather than remain completely outside the political system. How far have the government's long-range twin objectives been accom plished?
The objective of ensuring that the political parties are unable to mount a serious concerted challenge to the government has largely been achieved. The parties have in the past been unable to cooperate effectively. The basic line of cleavage has been between the Muslim and the secular parties, but even within the Muslim camp, the NU and Masjumi/Parmusi have normally been at loggerheads. Thus, in permit ting the parties toicontinue in existence, the government can rea sonably count on their being too divided to act in concerted opposi tion. At the same time, the government has repeatedly interfered in the internal affairs of the parties to ensure the election of compliant leaders. The result is that all the parties are now led by men who have neither the desire nor the capacity to challenge the dominant role of the Army. Men like Hardi, Subchan and Roem, who might, conceivably, have cooperated against the military, have, by one means or another, been shunted to the sidelines. Similar inter ventions have taken place in the smaller parties.
But with regard to its second objective, making the parties function effectively as links between the government and the people, the government's achievements are much less clear. Of the big parties, only the NU has been able to select leaders acceptable to the government on its own. In the cases of the Parmusi and the PNI, government intervention was needed to secure this result. Thus we must ask whether the Parmusi and PNI are really playing or can play genuinely representative linking roles.
In the case of Parmusi, it is reasonable to suspect that the former Masjumi leaders command much greater respect among the masses than do the present party heads. It can therefore be wondered whether the former Masjumi constituency feels that the Parmusi with out the old Masjumi leaders can really express its aspirations. It is probable that many former Masjumi supporters dismiss the present Parmusi leaders as government "stooges." In the case of the PNI, two questions arise. The first is to what extent the present leaders represent the party's mass following.
In 1966, when Ali Sastroamidjojo was overthrown as a result of military intervention at the PNI congress, it appeared that the masses were still loyal to
